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freud according to cézanne
jean-françois lyotard, translated by 
ashley woodward and jon roffe1
PAINTING AND ILLUSION
With regard to the relationship between psychoanalysis and art, there are many 
approaches which claim to be authorised by Freud.  Rather than once again 
undertaking an assessment of this area, better made by others2, we prefer here 
to propose a somewhat different problematic, by departing from an apparently 
minor remark: even if it’s not a question of properly applying a supposed 
psychoanalytic knowledge to a work and of providing a diagnostic of this work 
or of its author; even if one tries to develop one by one all the lines by which it is 
linked to the desire of the writer or the painter; and moreover, even if one situates 
an emotional space opened by the originary lack in response to the demand of 
the subject at the heart of creative activity3—it remains that the epistemological 
relation of psychoanalysis to the artwork is constituted in all cases in a unilateral 
manner, the first being the method applied to the second, conceived as its object. 
Thus the dimension of transference would be reintroduced into the conception 
of artistic production that nonetheless remains irreducible to the inventive scope 
and critique of the form of the work as such.4 The resistance of aestheticians, 
historians of art and artists to such a distribution of roles doubtless proceeds 
from the placement of the work in the position of passive object: they know, 
for various reasons, of the active power [pouvoir] to produce new meanings 
that these objects, supposed to be passive, bear. It is interesting to reverse the 
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relation, to examine whether this inaugural, critical activity might not be applied 
in turn to the object “psychoanalysis,” conceived of as a work. By questioning in 
this manner, one soon discovers, at the core of the Freudian conception of art, a 
striking disparity of status between the two arts that form its poles of reference, 
tragedy and painting. If the force of production of objects (which not only fulfill 
desire, but in which desire finds itself reflected or reversed)—the libidinal critical 
force—is tacitly ascribed to the first, it is explicitly refused to the second.
Jean Starobinski5 has shown how the tragic figures of Oedipus and Hamlet, the 
privileged objects of the Freudian reflection, are valuable also and above all as 
operators for the elaboration of the theory. If there isn’t a book or even an article 
by Freud on Oedipus or a fortiori on Hamlet, it is because, in Freud’s unconscious, 
the figure of the dead king’s brother plays (at least epistemologically) the role 
of a kind of screen or grille which, applied to the discourse of psychoanalysis, 
allows him to hear what he does not say, to bring together the disparate fragments 
of sense scattered throughout the material. The tragic scene is the place [lieu] 
to which the psychoanalytic scene is related at the end of interpretation and of 
construction. Art is here that from which psychoanalysis draws its resources for 
work and understanding. It is clear that such a relation was not possible and had 
no chance of being fruitful unless art, tragedy, offers, if not an analysis already, 
at least a privileged representation of what is in question in analysis, the desire of 
the subject in its relation with castration.6 Such is, in effect, the case of tragedy, 
Greek or Shakespearian; or again, of a plastic work like the Moses of Michelangelo. 
Jacques Lacan makes a similar use of Edgar Allen Poe’s novel The Purloined Letter 
in order to construct his thesis of an unconscious analogous to language.
If we turn to painting, we will observe that it occupies quite a different position 
in the thought of Freud and in psychoanalytic theory in general. The references 
to the pictorial object are very numerous in Freud’s writings, from the beginning 
to the end of his work (an entire essay is devoted to it7). Above all, though, the 
theory of dream and fantasy, the central mode of access to the theory of desire, is 
constructed around a latent “aesthetic” of the plastic object. The central intuition 
of this aesthetic is that the picture, in the same fashion as the oneiric  “scene,” 
represents an object, an absent situation. It opens a scenic space in which, in the 
absence of the things themselves, at least their representatives can be shown, and 
which has the capacity to receive and to accommodate the products of fulfilled 
desire. Like the dream, the pictorial object is thought according to the function 
of hallucinatory representation and lure. To grasp this object with words which 
describe it and which will serve to understand its sense will be, for Freud, to dispel 
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it. In order to convert the oneiric image or the hysterical phantasm into discourse, 
the signification is led towards its natural habitat, that of words and of reason, 
and the veil of representations, of alibis, behind which it is hidden, cast off.8
This assignment of the plastic work, as mute and visible, to reside in the region of 
the imaginary fulfillment of desire, can also be found at the heart of the Freudian 
analysis of the function of art. In effect, Freud distinguishes two components of 
aesthetic pleasure: a properly libidinal pleasure which comes from the content 
of the work itself, insofar as we allow it, by identification with a character, to 
fulfill our desire in fulfilling his destiny; but also, to speak in a preliminary 
fashion, a pleasure derived from the form or the position of the work presented 
to perception—not as a real object, but as a kind of plaything, an intermediary 
object, in relation to which acts and thoughts that the subject has not accounted 
for are authorized. Freud entitles this function of misappropriation in relation to 
reality and to the censorship “primary seduction”9: in the “aesthetic” situation, as 
in sleep, a proportion of the energy of counter-investment, employed to repress 
the libido, is freed and returned to the unconscious in the form of free energy, 
which will produce the figures of the dream or of art. In both cases, it is the 
rejection of every realistic criterion which allows the energy to discharge itself in 
a regressive way, in the form of hallucinatory scenes. The work therefore presents 
us with a primary seduction in that it promises, by its artistic status alone, the 
withdrawal of the barriers of repression.10 One sees that such an analysis of the 
aesthetic effect tends to indentify it with a narcotic effect. Here, what is essential 
is the realization of the unreality [déréalité] that is the phantasm. From a properly 
formal point of view, this hypothesis implies two attitudes. First, it leads to the 
privileging of the “subject” (the motif) in the painting:  the plastic screen will be 
thought in accordance with the representative function, as a transparent support 
behind which an inaccessible scene unfolds.  On the other hand, it invites us to find, 
hidden under the represented object—like the group of the Virgin, of its mother 
and of its brothers11 - a form (the silhouette of a vulture) supposedly determined 
in the phantasmatic of the painter. With the same stroke all non-representative 
painting is eliminated from the ambit of psychoanalysis, as is every “reading” of 
the work which is not primarily concerned with locating the “discourse” of the 
unconscious of the painting which would make phantasmatic silhouettes. On the 
basis of the categories of this aesthetic alone, it would a fortiori be necessary to 
abandon any grasp on a work of painting in which Freud’s “aesthetic position,” 
according to which the narcotic value of the work would be censured, is criticized 
(precisely by plastic means). And yet it is not excessive to think that everything 
which is important in painting from Cézanne onwards, far from favouring the 
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sleep of consciousness and the accomplishment of the unconscious desire of the 
art-lover [amateur], aims on the contrary to produce on the support some sort of 
analoga of the space of the unconscious itself, which could only arouse anxiety 
and revolt. And how, from the same perspective, to account for attempts made 
on all sides today by painters, but also by people in theatre or by musicians, to 
take the work from the neutralized place (the cultural edifice: museum, theatre, 
concert hall, conservatorium), where the institution consigns them? Are they not 
aimed at the destruction of the privilege of unreality which, according to Freud, 
would confer on the work and its position the power of seduction? It is clear 
that what is going on today is a situation of the artwork which hardly appears 
anymore to satisfy the conditions noted by the explicit aesthetic of Freud: the 
work fundamentally derealises reality more than aiming to realize, in an imaginary 
space, the unrealities of the phantasm.12 
One could draw from these few remarks the conclusion that if Freud’s analyses 
on the subject of plastic art appear inapplicable today, it is ultimately because 
painting has profoundly changed. After all, it could be said, the mission of those 
who inaugurated the psychoanalytic revolution was not to anticipate the pictorial 
revolution. This is to forget that the latter began under Freud’s eyes and that 
during the first half of the century, between his first writings (1895) and his last 
(1938), not only did painting change its subject, manner, and problem, but the 
pictorial space “mounted” by the men of the Quattrocento fell to ruin, and with it 
the function of painting as representation which was at, and remained at, the centre 
of the Freudian conception. That Freud didn’t have the eyes for this “critical” 
reversal of the pictorial activity, for this veritable displacement of the desire of 
painting, that he was so stuck to an exclusive position of desire—that of the Italian 
scenography of the 15th Century—cannot but surprise. The critical work began by 
Cézanne, continued or reengaged in all directions by Delaunay and Klee, by the 
cubists, by Malevitch and Kandinsky, attested that it was no longer at all a question 
of producing a phantasmatic illusion of depth on a screen treated like a window, 
but on the contrary of making visible plastic properties (lines, points, surfaces, 
values, colours) which representation only serves to efface; that it was therefore no 
longer a question of fulfilling desire through its delusion, but of capturing it and 
of methodically disappointing it by exposing its machinery. Freud’s ignorance is 
all the more surprising because this reversal of the pictorial function is in many 
respects akin to the reversal of the function of consciousness by Freudian analysis 
itself, inscribing as surface effects a vast subterranean upheaval which affected (and 
continues to affect) the supporting substrata of the Western social and cultural 
establishment. What has been in question since the 1880s, years which have seen 
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intermittent upheavals in the nature of the field concerned, is the position itself 
of desire in the modern West, the way in which the objects, words, images, goods, 
thoughts, works, women and men, births and deaths, illnesses and wars enter 
into circulation and are exchanged in society. If that transposition of anonymous 
desire which supports the institution in general and renders it acceptable must 
be put into words, one could say grosso modo that while this desire previously 
fulfilled itself in a regime of exchanges which imposes on the object a symbolic 
value—just as the unconscious of a neurotic produces and relates representatives 
of the repressed object according to a symbolic organization of Oedipal origin—
since the transformation of which we speak (and whose effect was best studied by 
Marx in the economic field), the production and circulation of objects has ceased 
to be regulated by reference to symbolic values, imputed to some mysterious 
Donator, but obeys the sole “logic” internal to the system. This is somewhat 
like how the formations of schizophrenia appear to escape from the regulation 
that neurosis obtains from the Oedipal structure, insofar as they are no longer 
subordinate to anything but the “free” effervescence of psychic energy. It is an 
accepted hypothesis that the Freud-event gives rise to a similar mutation in the 
order of discursive representation, and whose analogue in the order of plastic—
and in particular pictorial—representation is the Cézanne-event.  What would 
remain to be understood would be the motifs or modalities of the ignorance of 
the second by the first. In order to do so, it would be necessary first to show in 
what way the work of Cézanne attests to the presence of a similar displacement 
in the position of desire (here the desire of painting) and consequently in the 
function of painting itself. We will briefly examine the path that this work traces, 
and the element in which it is inscribed, from this point of view. 
PAINTING AND POWERLESSNESS 
Since Venturi’s monumental inventory,13 it is customary to distinguish four 
periods in Cézanne’s oeuvre: dark, impressionist, constructive, synthetic. Liliane 
Brion-Guerry draws from this account, while dramatizing it on two counts. 
First of all she shows that what motivates this plastic odyssey is the search for a 
solution to a problem which is also plastic: the unification of the spatial content, 
the represented object, and what contains it, the atmospheric envelope. In the 
second place, she suggests that this desire for plastic unity, in fulfilling itself in the 
aforementioned four broad approaches, repeats or at least revives the principal 
conceptions of space that appeared in the history of painting: space moving to 
several vanishing points, comparable to the painting of antiquity, in the first 
period (1860-1872); in the second, impressionist period (1872-1887), space of the 
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Italo-Hellenistic type where the planes of light do not succeed in being integrated 
into a coherent system; space on the contrary too well structured, too “tight,” of 
the third period (1878-1892), which suggests a comparison with that of certain 
Roman “primitives”; finally at the time of the last period, from 1892 to his death in 
1906, the rediscovery, if not of the classical perspective of the Quattrocento, then 
at least of an expression of depth analogous to that of some Baroques, or, better 
still, some water-colourists of the Far East. 
The  trajectory of Cézanne’s oeuvre would thus condense almost the entire 
history of painting, at least the history of perspective, or, better still, the history 
of painted space. In this regard, however, two things must be noted. First, if this 
is the case, it would be attributed to an originary inability, to a lack which would 
continually reinitiate the plastic investigation at each stage: the incapacity of 
Cézanne to see and to render the represented object and its place according to the 
“classical” perspective, that is to say according to the rules of the geometric optic 
and the techniques of scalar enlargement [mise au carreau] established by the 
“perspectivalists” between the 15th and the 17th centuries. This incapacity already 
illuminates a first enigma: why Cézanne could not remain an impressionist. As P. 
Francastel has shown,14 while impressionist light may well decompose the object 
by substituting the aerial tone for the local tone, the space in which the object is 
suspended remains in principle that of the Quattrocento, which is to say, that of 
representation. When a landscape of Cézanne’s15 is compared with one of Pissaro’s 
of the same view, one senses how much the first is racked by uncertainty, by what 
Merleau-Ponty called Cézanne’s doubt. 16  Even with this period (the second in 
Venturi’s taxonomy), painting, instead of responding to the question ‘what 
unitary law does the production of the pictorial object obey?’, seems to hesitate, 
suspending its response. In fact the picture does respond: there is no such unitary 
law; the question of the unity of the sensible remains open, or this unity is lacking.
Second, it must be emphasised that this deficiency contains potentially the entire 
critique of representation. If one is not satisfied by the unification of the place 
[lieu] that perspectivalist composition offers, the study of procedures such as the 
complete review of “primitive” space (third period) may follow, or, on the contrary 
(fourth period) the suppression of all structure or drawn outline, and the free play 
of what Cézanne called “colouring sensations.” In each case, these procedures 
all oppose their status as representations, sharing in common the fact that, far 
from erasing themselves and slipping away from the opacity of the support in the 
illusion of a transparent window as is done in the perspectivalist technique, they 
reveal and recognize the picture as in fact an object whose principle is not beyond 
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itself (in the represented), but internal, in the arrangement of colours. There is 
in this modest technical difference a veritable transformation of the relation with 
the object in general, a veritable transformation of desire.
This transformation is not an achievement but something given; or rather, suffered. 
Cézanne’s pictorial journey moves in the originary element of an uncertainty, of 
a suspicion in relation to what is presented as “natural law” in the schools of 
painting, just as Freud’s journey supposes the initial rejection of the principle of 
the unification of psychic phenomena by consciousness and the hypothesis of 
an irrepressible principle of dispersion (sexuality, primary process, death drive). In 
both cases, this suspicion, this deficiency, is given first and everywhere underlies 
this work of displacement, whether theoretical or plastic, that it undertakes. This 
means that it is vain to search in the failure of the composition, plastic for Cézanne, 
for the (dialectical) reason for the subsequent invention. Every composition is a 
failure and a success; they only succeed each other in a surface history, and are 
contemporaries in the substratum where Cézanne’s desire, immobile, generates 
disconnected figures, divided spaces, contrary points of view.
Through a close analysis of works undertaken in the four periods, it would not 
be difficult to show the degree to which the principle of dispersion is constantly 
active. Here we will make do with some rapid remarks on certain of the still lifes. 
In La pendule noir [The Black Clock] (1869-1871; Venturi calalogue no. 70), three 
properties, alone and in combination, open a space of non-locality that is also 
obtained by other means in the Vase de fleurs [Vase of Flowers] (1873-75; Venturi 183) 
in the Louvre, and which appears in what is called the impressionist period. The 
uncertainty of the scale due to the presence of the glass, the coexistence of two 
vanishing points which orders two simultaneous systems of linear perspective—
incompatible according to the rules of the school—and finally the use of a regime 
of values by violent contrasts (black/white) which tips the black background 
towards the front and the first plane bristles with active lines as if to defend itself. 
In the latter work, in addition to the action of manifest deformations—such as 
that of the edge of the table or the shadow or the dissymmetry of the sides of the 
vase—the uncertainty of the place results above all and on the one hand in the 
desynthesization of surfaces, provoked not only by the (properly impressionist) 
encroachment on their locales, but the traces ostentatiously left by a violent 
touch. On the other hand, there is a predilection with delocalization which would 
render the painted image analogous to the virtual image that a myopic eye forms 
of real flowers. All of these operations, and others bearing on the ground, lead to 
the dissipation of all representative illusion. The search is oriented towards what 
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may be called an economics of the psychic system, that is to say an organization not 
of representatives or signifiers subject to a semiology, but quantities of energy, of 
pulsional origin in Freud but taken in the Cézannean sense of plastic character 
(lines, values, and the chromatic energies taught by Pissarro) which induces in 
the spectator circulations, not of significations, even less of information, but of 
affects. 
If you now take certain versions of the Nature morte au compotier [Still Life with 
Compotier], for example that of 1879-1882 (Venturi 341), you will again notice 
some deformations of a purely plastic character. You will see the famous strict, 
short, oblique, almost ‘written’ touch intrude, which forbids the eye from losing 
itself in the vision of the object, and returns it to its own synthetic activity; you 
will note there a number of paradoxes in the usage of values of which the result is 
the flattening of the “represented” on the bi-dimensional support. It is true that 
in this work, which appears in the period called “constructive,” such a flattening 
goes hand in hand with a rigorous organization of the surface which leaves little 
of the play of hesitations, so that the delocalization relative to classical space is 
compensated by an over-localization in an almost abstract space (this is L. Brion-
Guerry’s term). But in the final period, the principle of dispersion will once more 
loosen the grip of constructivism. One observes, for example in the Nature mort au 
pichet, aux pommes et aux oranges [Still Life with Pitcher, Apples, and Oranges] in the 
Louvre (1895-1900; Venturi 732)—in addition to the instability of profiles which 
recalls that of the first two periods, and the tendency to eliminate the opposition 
of planes by deformation, as in the preceding period—an organization of colour 
(here a dominant red polarized between purple/blue and orange/yellow) which, 
like in the landscapes of this period, suggest only space in the midst of flux and 
chromatic stases (to the exclusion of line and value). 
Rather than denying that something went on between the first works and the 
last, it is a question of refusing the somewhat pedagogical reading which, by 
putting the accent on the dialectical articulation of periods in the diachrony of 
surface, leaves in the dark the subterranean principle of derepresentation which 
permanently operates in Cézanne’s approach to the object. Merleau-Ponty17 was 
entirely correct to make this principle the core of the work in its entirety, but his 
analysis remained subordinate to a philosophy of perception that allowed him to 
rediscover the true order of the sensible in Cézannean disorder, and to lift the veil 
that Cartesian and Galilean rationalism had thrown over the world of experience. 
We have no reason to believe that the curvature of Cézannean space, its intrinsic 
disequilibrium, the passion that the painter felt for the baroque organisation of 
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plastic place, for the Venetians, for El Greco, his equal hatred of Gauguin, Van 
Gogh and Ingres; that his desire, constantly expressed in his conversations and 
correspondence, the desire that “works,” this same desire that allowed him, when 
he wanted to make it understood that for him the curvature is in no way exclusive to 
a geometric “order,” to choose the example of volumes on a curved surface (“treat 
nature by the cylinder, the sphere, the cone”) to the exclusion of cubes and of all 
polyhedrons on a plane surface (which one appears not to have noticed when one 
pretends to make of this formula the anticipated programme of cubism)—we have 
no reason to believe that this passion for the spherical is more free from marks of 
desire and more fit to restore to us in person the phenomenality of the sensible 
than were Uccello’s passion for perspective, Leonardo’s for the model or Klee’s 
for plastic possibility. If the psychoanalytic approach to the work has a virtue, it 
is most certainly that of convincing us that, even if the painter is persuaded that 
all marking is imitation, “reality,” “nature,” and “motif” will never be something 
more than an object beyond reach (becoming a picture in its turn, “the picture of 
nature,” writes Cézanne) for which the activity of painting comes to substitute 
the object that fashions his reworked desire.
Reworked, in order that the oeuvre not be reduced to a symptom lacking in any 
critical bearing. It is this reworking which motivates Cézanne’s journey in the 
element of formal uncertainty. If it were necessary to psychoanalyse the work, 
it would first be necessary to attempt to account for the deficiency of which we 
previously spoke and to which the penchant for curvature correlates. It would 
be necessary to again assemble all of the features in the history of the life of the 
painter which form his psychic portrait, his “destiny”: the father, enamoured of 
social success, a pawnbroker capable of going to settle in the house of his debtor 
in order to keep accounts of their household and to be repaid with the savings thus 
extracted, and in much the same way the holder of his son’s purse strings until his 
death; Paul himself an illegitimate child, acknowledged, then legitimated by the 
later marriage of his father and mother, living in turn with Hortense, with whom 
he had a son three years later in 1872, but hiding his household from his father 
until 1886 (the painter was then 47 years old) in order to be able to keep the benefit 
of the pension he received and which allowed him to devote himself to painting; 
the secret project of a will in favour of his mother instigated and realised in 1883; 
the episode in 1885, a liaison so well-concealed that we know nothing but what is 
said on the back of a study in pencil and in some letters to his friend Zola, who was 
charged with acting as a mailbox; Zola with whom Cézanne breaks in 1886, the 
same month in which he married (in the presence of his parents), after which the 
father dies; the life of the painter always apart from his wife and his son. And some 
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traits less evident, without doubt more interesting: the passion of the young man 
for Latin and Alexandrine verse, a poem of youth relating “a terrible story” where 
“the woman in my arms, the woman with rosy complexion / disappears suddenly 
and transforms / into a pale cadaver with angular contours,” the reiteration in the 
conversations and letters, up until the end, of the theme “they won’t get their 
hooks into me”; the motif of the apples18; the bellicose immobility, the impatient 
reserve, the silences which made Zola fulminate, the incessant moving, the game 
of continual coming and going between Paris and Aix … 
All this together would still not be enough to make the oeuvre known in its double 
dimension: of lack or originary abandonment, and of the continual displacement of 
figures and plastic devices. We could certainly venture to draw some correlations 
in this material from his life. Thus, before the works of the first period, we are 
justified in thinking that painting fulfills a properly phantasmatic function, and 
that for the young Cézanne, the act of representation accomplishes the desire to 
see the woman (the object) which is refused to him (by the father?). Thus, their 
so-called generic subjects and strong erotic and sadistic content, their theatrical 
mises en scène (curtains, spectators, veils raised by servants revealing female nudes), 
but also with the unilateral aggressivity of the touch which inscribes itself on the 
material as if to penetrate it, the mixing up of perspective according to several 
simultaneous points of view which position the scene in an imaginary non-place, 
and above all the “brash brushwork [facture couillarde]” with tar-like heaviness, 
operating without chromaticism in black and white, which floods the works with 
the light of insomnia. It is no more adventurous, though nearly as pointless, to 
show that if Pissaro “was a father” for Cézanne, “a man to consult and something 
like the good Lord,” it is most certainly that the speech [parole] refused him by his 
father the banker, from 1872, is given back to him by the impressionist painter, 
and that the appearance of colour on Cézanne’s palette coincides, as with Klee or 
Van Gogh, with a sort of redemption (the word is from Klee’s Journal) of the blind, 
nocturnal virility of the preceding period, by a passivity capable of welcoming 
its other: light. At the same time, the generic scenes become less numerous, the 
theme of male and female bathers expands rapidly, attesting that in the place of 
voyeurism trained on female flesh, the act of painting disperses the body, male 
as well as female, in atmospheric volumes. A veritable reversal commutes the 
roles: the object ceases to be intensely libidinal, and is neutralised; the still lifes, 
where the space is charged with desexualised, chromatic energy, gains increasing 
importance.
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As for the third period, called constructive or abstract, its libidinal “reason” 
would offer more resistance to analysis if we did not know that in its middle, 
during the course of the years 1882-1887, the symptoms of a profound disruption 
accumulate in Cézanne’s life: the will, the liaison carried out in secret, the rupture 
with Zola, the marriage, and the death of the father. In the work, the weight of 
the anguish of binding, of constructing becomes apparent, and extends far 
enough to distort the object and space such that they take part in the “logic” in 
which Cézanne then seeks to place and bind them. He, who loves that “it turns,” 
paints landscapes like “playing cards,” where space is flattened and blocks the 
circulation of the chromatic flux. Above all, it is a system closely tied to a victory 
over mobility, of parallels over perpendiculars, and therefore, following the word 
of Cézanne himself, the point of view of Pater omnipotens aeterne Deus [God the 
omnipotent and eternal Father] over that of human beings. In order to throw light 
on a displacement so contrary to the penchant for the baroque and the search for 
curvature, and to confront it with the effects of the perceptible tremor in his life, 
would it not be necessary to advance the hypothesis, this time highly perilous, 
of a sort of regression in the pulsional play, which would in turn have provoked 
the tightening of the social and plastic systems of defence, leading Cézanne to 
occupy, in his family, and metaphorically in his painting, the place of the father? 
The final period, with its highs and lows, is marked by the loosening of the 
constructive grip, the relaxation of volumes, the free play between objects, and 
even between the dashes, as in the Saint Victoire of the time, in the Baigneuses 
[Bathers] in the National Gallery in London, or in the watercolours. The 
compulsion to control fades away, the construction becomes almost drifting, 
the space freed, the compartmentalizing pattern disappearing, the picture itself 
becoming a libidinal object, pure colour, pure “femininity,” a substance at the 
same time soluble and opaque. To assure oneself of the fact that Cézanne, in his 
own way, “knew” this, one must merely understand how he poses the problem of 
“points of contact” between tones, while forbidding himself any recourse to the 
black line in order to define contours. But even here there remains something 
that feeds the hypothesis of a correlation with his life, an extreme tension that 
continues to inflect the 1890s, and only shows signs of diminution around 1903: his 
consolidation in the position of the master at the centre of a growing/developing 
circle of young disciples (É. Bernard, Larguier, Camoin) or of amateurs like A. 
Vollard. He compares himself to the “grand leader of the Hebrews”; he “glimpses 
the Promised Land,” writing to J. Gasquet: “Perhaps I came too soon. I was the 
painter of your generation more than of mine.” He occupies his paternal position 
openly, aging with pleasure, dead already at the age of sixty-five, engendering 
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transference by alleging powerlessness: “You don’t see what a sad state I’ve been 
reduced to. Out of control, a man who does not exist …” But this is no longer, as in 
the constructive period, the object-woman lost and reconstituted by logic, or, in 
the dark period, by mise en scène. On the contrary, it is now the object-woman, the 
colour, the flesh of the world, received and returned (“fulfilled,” says Cézanne) 
in the guise of the painting, like a body, in its evanescence, in its fluidity. A living, 
but fragmented body, a unity always deferred: the erotic body par excellence. A 
secret libidinal involvement must be implicated between the position of the old 
master and the capacity to render, on the canvas, this long-standing incapacity (the 
powerlessness to bind). Cézanne “knew” this relation—he writes to Camoin in 
190319: “I have nothing to hide in art,” and to his son eight days before his death: “I 
believe the sensation which composes the basis of my work to be impenetrable.” 
(15 Oct. 1906).
A LIBIDINAL “ECONOMIC” AESTHETIC
One can therefore entertain oneself by producing these correlations between oeuvre 
and life, but it is certain that they always end up failing, for at least two reasons. 
The first is that such a “psychoanalysis” is impossible in the absence of the subject 
(the painter); the second, that even if he was alive, it will run up against the enigma 
of an exploited powerlessness, of a capacity to bear this abandonment and passivity, 
to welcome without mastering, to “arrange the void, to prepare the space in which 
the creative forces can be given free rein.”20 For the flux of energy, this void is the 
possibility of circulating in the psychic apparatus without encountering the highly 
structured systems that Freud called bound, systems which can only discharge the 
energy by channeling it through its invariant—“rational” or imaginary—forms. 
Cézanne’s immobility before the model is the putting-in-suspense of the action 
of already known forms or already revealed phantasms. In turn, the work could be 
conceived as an energetic analogue of the psychic apparatus: the pictorial object 
can also find itself blocked by formal, immutable figures which sometimes appeal 
to the rules of rationalism and realism (like the perspective of the Quattrocento), 
and sometimes to the expression of the depths of the soul. This is to say that 
the energy of lines, of values, of colours, finds itself bound in a code and in a 
syntax, those of a school or those of an unconscious, and can no longer circulate 
on the support unless it conforms with this matrix.21 It is because the paintings 
of Gauguin or Van Gogh are to Cézanne’s eyes examples of such a blockage, of 
clenching unconscious forms that have “gotten their hooks in,” that he did not 
want to hear about them. 
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Such an hypothesis, should it be formulated, would provide the outlines of an 
“economic aesthetic” in the sense that Freud speaks of a libidinal economy 
(concerned with the theory of the drives [pulsions] and the affects). It would 
without a doubt release the “applied psychoanalysis” (of art) from the weight 
of a theory of representation, without speaking of the burden of an even more 
dissatisfying [frustré] account—of libido, sexuality, Oedipus, castration and the 
other products on sale in the open market of modern aesthetics—that it continues 
to impose. It would allow one to show that the semiological or semiotic approach, 
a fortiori scenographic, rests on a major mistake concerning the nature of the act of 
painting itself: since, in the end, one does not paint in order to speak, but in order 
to keep silent. It is not true that the last Sainte Victoires speak nor even signify—
they are there, like a critical libidinal body, absolutely mute, truly impenetrable 
because they hide nothing. Since, that is to say, their principle of organisation and 
of action does not rest outside of themselves (in a model to imitate, in a system 
of rules to respect). They are impenetrable because they have no depth; they are 
without signifiance, without underside. 
If Freud did not elaborate such an aesthetic, if he remained insensible to the 
Cézannean and post-Cézannean revolution, if he persisted in treating the work like 
an object concealing a secret, in discovering in it bound forms like the phantasm 
of the vulture, it is because for him the image has the status of a deposed, obscured 
signification, which represents in its absence. Images, and therefore works, are 
for him screens which must be rent—as he does to those in the book on Saint-
John Perse that Jakob Freud, his father, gave to him when he was four years old 
-  zur Vernichtung, reducing them to nothing. To make Freud’s theory of resistance 
the lynchpin of a theory critical of the prevailing modern passion for making 
everything speak would be one of the tasks, and not the least, of an aesthetics 
based on a libidinal economics. It would show that this prevalence proceeds from 
the prevalence accorded by Freud to the figure of the Father in the interpretation 
of the artwork, as in that of the dream or the symptom—not of the “real” father, 
but of the Father-function (Oedipus and castration) which is constitutive of 
desire insofar as, on its terms, demand runs up against a lack of response and 
against prohibition. Such a prevalence leads the psychoanalytic aesthetic to grasp 
the artistic object as holding the place of an offering, a gift, in a transferential 
relation, and pays no attention to the formal properties of the object, other than 
insofar as it symbolically signals its unconscious purpose. 
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Such was Freud’s approach to Michelangelo’s Moses22: in analysing the play of 
the fingers in the beard and the position of the Tablets beneath the arm, Freud 
extracts that which constitutes the potential force of the work, the Mosaic drama 
of mastered fury. As this dramatic theme is absent from Exodus, he attributes 
responsibility for it to the transferential relation of the artist with Pope Julius 
II, whose tomb the statue would adorn. According to Freud, this anger of Moses 
reflects the violent temperament of the Pope and of the artist himself, and attests 
in both to the presence of the desire to have done with the law of the Father, to 
refuse castration; but that it can be overcome, that Moses recovers himself, that 
he lowers his hand, is itself evidence of the ultimate acceptance of this law. The 
work of Michelangelo is therefore understood as a message addressed by the artist 
to Julius II. It is this message, assumed to be latent in the marble, that takes hold 
of Freud’s desire in turn, in order to restore the content clearly, that is to say, in 
words. This desire is articulated therefore according to at least two dimensions: 
the identification with Moses, and the verbalisation in a discourse of knowledge. 
One sees that such an aesthetic not only privileges the art of representation—it 
also arranges its interpretation along the axes of the transferential relation; it 
aims to refer the work back to Oedipus and castration; it lodges the object in the 
space of the imaginary and understands it by applying a reading guided by the 
code of a symbolic. 
We could not say that this is false. But we also see that it can blind itself to 
essential mutations in the position of the aesthetic object. Shouldn’t we connect 
the element of plastic uncertainty that we notice in the painting of Cézanne to 
a refusal (regardless of whether or not it is conscious) to instantiate the work, a 
refusal to place it in a space of donation or of exchange, a desire not to put it into 
circulation in the network governed in the final instance by the Oedipal structure 
and the law of castration? This refusal itself would be what prevents Cézanne from 
being satisfied with any plastic formula, whether it be, as in the first period, the 
imaginary and literary restitution of fulfilled desire, or in the third the reference 
to a strict and transcendent law of the prescribed form of objects on the support. 
In painting the emergence of a strange desire becomes visible: that the painting 
itself be an object, no longer valued as a message, threat, supplication, prohibition, 
exorcism, morality, or allusion - no longer engaged in a symbolic relation—but be 
valued as an absolute object, relieved of the transferential relation, indifferent to 
the relational order, active only in the energetic order and in the silence of the body. 
This desire makes room for the emergence of a new position of the object to paint. 
The denial of the transferential function, of the place that it is supposed to occupy 
in the drama of castration, its position outside of the circuit in which symbolic 
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exchange takes place, constitutes an important mutation. We have suggested 
that it makes the pictorial object slide from a position of the neurotic type to a 
position of the psychotic or perverse type—if it is true that an object occupying 
the latter is detached from the symbolic law in general, that it escapes from the 
rule of sexual difference and of castration, that it is the site of masochistic and 
sadistic manipulation, that desire is denied and the look fascinated at the same 
time. The fetish object gathers these features in itself, features that one could 
justifiably claim to recognize in Cézanne’s last pieces. And, inevitably, they will be 
found in the works of cubism, of Klee, of Kandinsky, of the American abstracts …
In this way, it would become possible to understand the subsequent success of 
Cézanne, his importance, and, generally speaking, the reverberation with which 
the displacement of the object in painting since 1900 has met. That is, if the 
painted object was submitted to the mutation we have described, ceasing to be 
a referential and represented object in order to become the place of libidinal 
operations that engender an inexhaustible polymorphy, we should perhaps 
advance the hypothesis that the same goes for other objects: objects of production 
and consumption, objects to sing of and to listen to, objects to love. 
We are justified in suggesting that the veritable transformation which capitalism 
performs on the objects that circulate in society—above all, in the most recent 
forms, say for Western Europe over the last 15 years—will involve, sooner or later, 
all objects, and not economic objects alone (as an economism a little too confident 
of the impermeability of its boundaries believes). At issue is not this “belief,” 
or the “development” of societies, but the annihilation of objects qua bearers of 
symbolic values underwritten by desire and culture, and their reconstitution in 
the indifferent terms of a system which no longer has anything outside of itself on 
which the objects that circulate within it can be anchored: neither God, nor nature, 
nor need, nor even the desire of the alleged “subjects” of exchange. The pictorial 
object of Cézanne and his successors, insofar as it carries the traits of psychosis or 
perversion, is much more than a simple analogue of the economic object analysed 
by Marx in Capital or, yet again, of the linguistic object constructed by structural 
linguistics. By extending in this way the scope of an aesthetic centred on a libidinal 
economics, one finds oneself in a position to at once put the Cézannean object 
in its right place, to give a possible reason for the aesthetic blindness of a Freud 
too attached to identifying a position for the neurotic object, and to take account 
of this event in which we have been submerged since the start of the century: the 
dislocation of the very position of diverse social objects, the mutation of desire 
underlying our institutions.
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